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Abstract
China's unprecedented economic growth led some
scholars to conclude that it will replace the United
States as the future global hegemon. However, China's
intentions in exercising future global leadership are
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yet unknown and difficult to extrapolate from its often
contradictory behaviour. A preliminary overview of
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sistent with the analysis of those who prognosticate
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China's island building in the South China Sea reveals
its potentially coercive intentions. This inference is conChina's violent rise. Conversely and simultaneously,
China's participation in peacekeeping operations and
its global investments evince its benevolent hegemonic
intentions, which are congruent with the argument of
those who predict China's peaceful hegemonic ascent.
Confronted with these divergent tendencies in China's
recent international relations, and assuming its continued rise, it is, thus, essential to examine China's strategic intentions and how these may ultimately project its
violent or peaceful hegemonic rise. This article argues
that the “Third Way” or “Dutch‐style” hegemony is
highly instructive in this context and, thus, should be
examined and added to the existing debate on China's
rise as either a benevolent or coercive hegemon. We
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argue that Dutch‐style hegemony may be the most viable way for China to proceed in its global hegemonic
ascendancy.
KEYWO RDS
benevolent hegemon, China, coercive hegemon, Dutch‐style hegemon,
intentions

1 | INTRODUCTION
Since Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 and opened China's economy throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, China's rise is the cause of great concern for its proximate neighbours as well as for
the other global great powers. Unprecedented double‐digit economic growth propelled China's
domestic market to second place in the world, scarcely trailing the United States. As Deng
Xiaoping promoted China's economic opening, he promulgated several mottos intended to
motivate, characterise, and underscore China's peaceful foreign policy during these decades of
uninterrupted economic ascendancy. Among Deng's foreign policy characterisations, the pronouncements most often discussed and dissected by policy analysts and academics alike were
“[韬光养晦] taoguang yanghui (i.e., concealing its capacities and biding its time), [善于守拙]
shanyu shuozhuo (good at maintaining a low profile), and [决不当头] juebu dangtou (never
claiming leadership)” (Shen, 2012, p. 7; quoted from Gong, Li, & Gao, 1998).
Deng's influential style became a tradition among successive Chinese presidents. From Jiang
Zemin to Hu Jintao, and now to Xi Jinping, China continued to nurture and promulgate the
image of a status quo power, with entirely peaceful intentions. In line with this unfolding tradition in China's foreign policy and grand strategy, President Xi advanced more security concepts,
emphasising a foreign policy strategy that stresses China's peaceful intentions.1 Accordingly,
President Xi referred to China's approach as “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable,” calling on the rest of the world “to align their diverse security interests within a common
project; avoiding monopolising security affairs; working towards security without exclusive
alliances; and tackling the full range of traditional and nontraditional threats” (Holslag, 2014).
China abided by Deng's dictums and standards in foreign policy throughout most of its
process of expansion and ascendancy in the latter part of the 20th century (Pilling, 2010).
However, in the early 2000s, Chinese policy advisor, Zheng Bijian, articulated and promoted
the “Peaceful Rise” strategy. The policy‐maker explained and publicised the grand strategy
departure in a 2005 Foreign Affairs article titled, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great‐Power Status”
This article analyses China's strategic intentions and how these may ultimately project its violent or peaceful hegemonic
rise. It maintains that, although it is difficult to define accurately China's future hegemonic role and general systemic
behaviour, a “Third Hegemonic Way” or Dutch‐style hegemony is highly instructive in this context and, thus, should
be examined and added to the existing debate on China's peaceful or violent rise as either a benevolent or potentially
coercive hegemon. We argue that the Dutch‐style hegemony may be the most viable way for China to proceed in its
global hegemonic ascendancy in a future world order.
The concept of “grand strategy” refers to a long‐term, higher level strategy of a given country, usually a great power or
superpower, that orchestrates the use of its diplomacy, economic policy, and military strategy to advance its position
within the world order, the country's national interest, and fundamental security. Examples of grand strategies include
isolationism, imperialism, off‐shore balancing, or selective engagement.
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(State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2005, 2011; Zheng, 2005). Essentially, the
article's purpose was to reassure China's neighbours and the West. It tried to allay their fears
and concerns about China's rise by underscoring its peaceful intentions. It argued that China
was a status quo state and posed no threat to them or world peace. The timing of the article
was critically important, too. It appeared at a time when many American academics and pundits
had started to compare China's rise with Germany's in the late 19th century or Napoleonic
France's in the late 18th century and early 19th century. Instead of dispelling fear and distrust,
the title of the article, its message, and the timing of its publication perversely reinforced the
concerns of those state actors that subscribed to the notion of the “China threat” perception
(Goldstein, 2003).
The Great Global Recession of 2008 started in the West, specifically in the United States. It
affected these countries negatively while leaving China generally unscathed. Consequently,
China's self‐perception turned from viewing itself as merely rising to the actual accomplishment
of its rise to great power status. China's role as a global financial lender and an influential buyer
of national bonds, helping to rescue highly developed Western states from a more severe financial crisis, bolstered its great power perception. Accordingly, Chinese decision‐makers and a vast
segment of its population recognised that the time of China's global leadership had finally
arrived while that of the United States was rapidly ebbing and ending (Nye, 2011).
According to multiple economic indicators, China's rise continues, albeit at a slower pace in
the last 5 years. Hence, barring unforeseen catastrophic events, this trend places China on
course to surpass the United States as the future global economic hegemon, much like the
United States exceeded the British Empire in the early 1900s. Assuming China's economic,
political, and military rise continues, ultimately leading it to challenge the U.S. global
hegemony, the critical theoretical question remains: What kind of global hegemon will China
be? Such a query allows us to enter the ongoing discussion on its ascent and examine the nature
and type of China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory critically.
China may transition into one out of three possible hegemonic paths: First, based on benevolent leadership intentions such as norm‐and‐rule‐creating and norm‐and‐rule‐imposing, it may
transition into a free‐trade‐encouraging, and free‐trade‐sustaining hegemon, much like Britain
and the United States behaved, respectively, during the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana.2
Second, based on coercive and assertive intentions of domination, China may transition into
an aggressive, coercive, and dominating hegemon such as Napoleonic France or Imperial
Japan.3
Third, China may transition into a Dutch‐style hegemonic path.4 This alternative evinces a
hegemon mainly motivated by neutral, self‐interested, state‐centric economic intentions. In this
sense, it may even lack significant interest in the management of the international political system. Also, this third trajectory exhibits characteristics of a self‐controlled and status‐quo‐driven
hegemon, focused mostly on profiting from international trade and finance. Accordingly, this
type of global leader acts in pursuit of purely nationalistic goals, self‐interests, and economic
self‐aggrandisement like the Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries.5 In this third pathway,
2

For a more in‐depth discussion of benevolent and coercive hegemons, see Martín (2006, p. 36f.).
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See, for example, Snidal (1985, p. 579ff.) or Ikenberry (1989, p. 378ff.), for further reading on how different hegemonic
styles may be perceived as “coercive” or “benevolent.”
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China may be a global hegemon only to the extent that, based on self‐interests, it may be able,
willing, and committed to sustain and conform to prevailing norms, principles, and rules of the
international neoliberal economic order in place since 1947.
Provided that China continues its ascent, this article explores which global hegemonic trajectory it will take among those three discussed above. Depending on which path (or combination
of paths), we examine what kind of global hegemon China would become and why it is vital for
the security and stability of the evolving global order? This study will, first, establish our working definitions of hegemony and the three attendant hegemonic trajectories that are central to
this article succinctly: that is, benevolent hegemonic leadership; coercive hegemonic domination; and Dutch‐style, order‐conforming hegemonic governance.6 Second, we contextualise
historically the theoretical foundation that underpins the central questions of this article. In this
part, we advance our working definition of hegemony and the notions of hegemonic trajectories.
These concepts will help to frame the analysis of China's interests and intentions as a rising and
potential global hegemon. Third, we examine the three heuristic hegemonic trajectories in
practice and establish their differences. Fourth, we succinctly provide some historical background and analyse recent developments in China's international affairs. Based on select cases,
we attempt to identify strong clues about the range of China's interests and intentions. This
methodological explanation will help us to elucidate why China may opt for a power‐transition
trajectory through one or a combination of the three hegemonic pathways discussed above.
Relatedly, this will ultimately determine China's global hegemonic type. Sections 5, 6, and 7
analyse China's intentions about each of the hegemonic heuristic types. The final section
summarises the findings of China's future as a global hegemonic player.

2 | HEGEMONY AND H EGEMONIC LEADERSHIP
By “hegemony,” we mean international leadership, particularly in the sphere of global political
economy. Accordingly, we differentiate hegemony from notions of empire, imperialism,
unipolarity, or a sort of world government. Instead, we reserve the concept fundamentally to
define a kind of global political‐economic order under the leadership of one great power or
hegemon, that is, a systemic player who reaches hegemonic status through the possession of
significant relative power—both in terms of tangible and intangible resources—and, thus, is
able and willing to employ it to promote and maintain a type of hegemony. In turn, one or a
combination of political processes, ranging from outright dominance to benevolent guidance,
and rule‐conforming governance, promote hegemonic leadership. These three leadership
approaches will become clearer once we discuss in a stylised manner below the origin and
evolution of these concepts from antiquity to contemporary theoretical perspectives.
The conceptual origin of “hegemon” and “hegemony” dates back to Ancient Greece, where
these conceptions referred to different situations such as when a prominent actor played the
leading role in a voluntary military alliance among reciprocally consenting city‐states. Further,
it signified a situation when a city‐state became an imperial power through the accumulation of
overwhelming capabilities and political leadership. Finally, the notion of hegemony suggests a
guiding and governing principle. In this sense, a hegemon is an international leader that
promotes sociopolitical and cultural ideas. Notwithstanding ancient conceptual roots, the

Whereas the Dutch‐style or “Third Way” hegemonic trajectory is an original contribution of the authors, Erpul (2019)
coined originally the “order‐conforming” notion.
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publication of Antonio Gramsci's extracts of his prison writings in the 1950s enhanced the theoretical dimension and application of notions of hegemon and hegemony significantly.7
The literature on hegemony and hegemonic leadership resurfaced and became prominent in
the study of international political economy in the early 1970s. The publication of Charles P.
Kindleberger's The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (1973) renewed theoretical interest on the
conception of international leadership as a stabilising element in the global economy. This idea
fused with the notion hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s. Kindleberger's book is a study of the
causes of the Great Depression of 1929. The book's central thesis posits the absence of international economic leadership caused economic and political chaos in Europe. This outcome
resulted from the U.S.'s reluctance to lead and manage the global world economy during the
interwar period. Despite its paramount power, the U.S. disinclination to lead coincided with
Britain and other great European powers' weakness, exhaustion from a costly world war, and
inability—even if still willing—to lead the political‐economic global order at the end of the
Great War in 1918 (Kindleberger, 1973).
Several events set the international political‐economic order of the 1970s and 1980s in absolute
turmoil.8 On August 13, 1971, economic shocks hit during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Also,
in the early 1970s, the United States was increasingly perceived to be in economic decline—
mainly due to the cost of its ongoing war in Vietnam. Furthermore, the 1973 and 1979 major
oil crises—caused by OPEC Arab members' oil embargo against the United States and the West
and OPEC's oil price hikes, respectively—contributed to the aforementioned turmoil. These
political‐economic events rendered the most central theoretical perspectives of the time such as
classical realism, neorealism, and international political liberalism, inadequate. Their foci on
security, use of force, and conflict of interests, on the one hand, and liberal democracy, neoliberal
economic practices, and harmony of interests, on the other hand, failed to capture theoretically
speaking the complexity of the international political‐economic dynamics of the period.
General scholarly dissatisfaction with these theoretical perspectives led to alternative
positions such as hegemonic stability theory (HST) and the International Economic Regime
Perspective. These newer theories in the 1980s brought together realist and liberal assumptions
and explanations to elucidate a rapidly developing and highly complex international political‐
economic situation that proved extremely challenging for (and partly beyond) any of the leading
International Relations theoretical approaches of the time: Realism and International
Liberalism.
Robert Gilpin, following on the intellectual footsteps of Kindleberger, became one the major
proponents of HST. He affirmed that Stephen Krasner and him, “have both argued that the
hegemon created a liberal international economy primarily to promote its interests and its
political/security interests in particular” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 99). Nonetheless, Krasner distanced
their position from Kindleberger's more cosmopolitan liberal vision of HST by asserting that
“the Krasner/Gilpin state‐centric version (…) requires a dominant power with interest in a
liberal world economy and a willingness to expend economic and political resources to achieve
and maintain that goal” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 99).
Further, Gilpin elaborated that HST posits “that there can be no liberal international
economy unless there is a leader that uses its resources and influence to establish and manage
an international economy based on free trade, monetary stability, and freedom of capital
7
8

This paragraph draws on the work by Fontana (2006, pp. 23–26).

For historical background on these political‐economic events and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, see Frieden
(2006, pp. 339–351 and 363–372).
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movement” (Gilpin, 2001, p. 99f.). He closes this argument, stating something critically important for our discussion and analysis regarding hegemonic intentions and trajectories. He affirms
that HST postulates that “a leader must also encourage other states to obey the rules and
regimes governing international economic activities” (Gilpin, 2001, 99 f.). Gilpin opens the door
to the possibility of a hegemon leading an international political‐economic order by, first, sheer
imposition and domination (if need be by outright coercion) and, second, by gentle, persuasion,
encouragement, and guidance (if need be via positive incentives and benevolent manipulation).
This aimed at pushing other states in the system to follow the rules and adhere to acceptable
behaviour.
Different from Kindleberger, Krasner, and Gilpin's reasonings, Robert Keohane's
neoinstitutionalist regime theory maintained that hegemony alone was insufficient to promote
cooperation and sustain a global political‐economic order. In its place, Keohane (1984)
suggested that institutions, such as international economic regimes, are necessary to facilitate
the efficient operation of the international political‐economic order.9 This second theoretical
perspective in the 1980s suggests that international regimes promote global guidance and governance from pure, national self‐interests. This aspect is essential for our discussion and argument. This angle may indicate one of the three hegemonic paths that can offer strong clues
about China's hegemonic interests, intentions, and trajectory in the future. For example, assuming that China would want to become a global hegemon, it may have no recourse but to accept
the existing international economic order and work within it for the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding, there are strong indications of China's future leadership in the global economic
order. In this sense, China's recent efforts to build the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative may be harbingers of its purpose to establish a regional
economic order that may be expandable to global scale.10
To decipher and elucidate China's future and the course of its potential global hegemony, we
envision three possible hegemonic heuristic trajectories. These hinge on the notion that
“hegemony” is congruent with the worldview and national interest of a leading great power
in the international system. Consequently, through the use of sheer soft and hard powers, the
hegemon advances its interests by promoting a specific sociopolitical, economic, and security
order within the international system. We define these collectively as hegemony. In turn, this
may manifest in various styles and degrees of authoritativeness and rule making along a continuum. This spectrum may range from benevolent to coercive hegemony, with the purpose to govern interactions among states within the international system. Depending on which aspects the
hegemon emphasises, then the result will be one (or a combination thereof) of the three possible
hegemonic paths: benevolent‐leadership, coercive‐domination, or order‐conforming governance
a la Dutch‐style or third hegemonic way.

3 | HEGEMONIC TR AJEC TORIES I N P RACTICE
On the basis of the theoretical and conceptual discussion above, we would envision China taking on the leadership in significant issue areas and regions—much like the British Empire did
from 1846 up until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 or the United States from
roughly the time when it entered the Second World War on the side of the Allies (Gilpin,
9

For an analysis of these ideas, see Gilpin (2001, p. 84).
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1975; Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1976). The three global hegemony scenarios must be
adjusted to incorporate Chinese national characteristics and style. This consideration is a crucial
dimension as the literature is based fundamentally on the European and North American
hegemonic cases such as the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana. To be sure, the world never
encountered a truly, full‐blown Asian global hegemon. The closest instance was Japan's
near‐hegemony in the 1930s and the 1980s.
In practice, we envision three possible, heuristic hegemonic scenarios. First, it is China's
unchallenged hegemony in an international liberal order with overwhelmingly benevolent
intentions. In this scenario, China assumes the leadership position from the United States. From
this position, China actively engages in the promotion and management of “an international
economy based on free trade, monetary stability, and freedom of capital movement” (Gilpin,
2001, p. 99f.). This function would evolve in the existing political‐economic system, where
China would emphasise, perhaps, less liberal democracy and respect for individual initiative
and human rights in states participating in an international neoliberal economic order. Nevertheless, in this scenario, China would be vigorously involved and accepted on the international
stage, without violent resistance from other great powers. The process would mimic either the
U.S. or British global hegemonic models. This scenario is the peaceful rise of China described
by such scholars as Ikenberry (2013) or He (2007), and in more nuanced analyses, the collection
of essays in Ross and Tunsjø (2017) are highly instructive. Consistent with this line of reasoning,
Yan (2011) is enlightening. He also argues in this study about the notion of a benevolent
Chinese global hegemony or “‘[b]enevolent government’ [as] a policy for both domestic and
foreign affairs” as a viable future possibility (Yan, 2011, p. 167).
Second, China takes over forcefully from the U.S. international leadership and establishes
itself as a potentially coercive hegemon by utter domination of the global political‐economic system. In this situation, China would reorganise, reconstruct, and support a global order reflecting
its own preferred set of values, norms, and rules in the economic, political, and security realms.
To that end, China would display and implement coercive and dominating intentions, even to
the extent of using degrees of external violence if need be. By attempting to impose its will on
the rest of the world, China would behave similarly to the way previous coercive, revisionist
great powers did in yesteryears. It would be equivalent to the cases discussed by Goldstein
(2003) and Mearsheimer (2006) in the contexts of Napoleonic France between 1803 and 1815,
Wilhelmine Germany between 1890 and 1918, and Imperial Japan, particularly between the late
1920s to its defeat in the Second World War in 1946.
The third heuristic hegemonic scenario projects China to assume peacefully and gradually
international leadership from the United States. To that end, China will promote trade, perhaps
in a newly designed international trading system that may exclude political and military global
projections. In this context, China will display neutral and significantly less ideological international tendencies. It will reflect more purely pecuniary, self‐interest in profit maximisation.
Correspondingly, in this hypothesised global milieu, China will avoid using coercive threats
or any form of military statecraft. This third hegemonic trajectory is radically different from
the second benevolent trajectory. In the latter, China engages keenly and actively in the provision, promotion, maintenance, and advancement of the global political‐economic order. In the
third scenario, however, China portrays a passively reinforcing, order‐conforming actor of the
political‐economic system. In this sense, China is a significant actor motivated primarily by
financial concerns and national self‐interests. Accordingly, the active maintenance and
advancement of the international political‐economic order are secondary to China's ability to
rip selfish benefits from the smooth operation of the system. The historical exemplar of this
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third hegemonic model is the Dutch global hegemonic model of the 16th and 17th centuries.
This historical referent aligns coherently with a future world order, as described, for example,
by Zakaria (2013), in which “economics trumps politics.”
In the following sections, this article examines historical trends that may reveal similarities
and differences consistent with the three heuristic hegemonic trajectories expounded above.
This analytical exercise may help us expose and explain the present and future trends and paths
of a possible Chinese global hegemony in the 21st century. From this perspective, we will
examine, first, signs of China's peaceful rise by focusing on its participation in the global
environmental dialogue, as well as in some United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions
(PKMs), and systemic financial and investment efforts. Second, we will look for clues in China's
foreign policies and behaviour that may raise concerns about its possible violent and forceful
rise. From this vantage point, we will concentrate on China's island‐building efforts and its
absolute disregard for other nations' claims in the South China Sea and the emerging
Sino‐Russian Entente. A third historical trend of interest to the argument and analysis of this
study is China's effort to establish institutions such the AIIB that provides a vital forum for
economic and financial Chinese influence throughout the region and beyond and its increasing
interest in the exploitation of the Arctic. The latter are all instances of the trajectory consistent
with the Dutch global, commercial hegemony (Table 1).

4 | HIS TORIC AL BAC KG ROUND
China held the preeminent position of East Asian regional hegemon for almost two millennia
before it suffered a severe decline during its last imperial era, the Great Qing dynasty, which
the Manchus led under foreign rule. The outbreak of the First Opium War in 1839 provoked
the slow demise of China's influence over East Asia, ultimately leading to the end of its regional
hegemony. Also, the result of several costly defeats in war and the imposition of the infamous
“unequal” treaties led to the progressive semicolonisation of China's eastern seaboard territories
by the British Empire, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, the United States, Portugal, Italy,
Belgium, and Austria‐Hungary. These developments marked the beginning of the “Century of
Humiliation,” which roughly ended after the Second World War in 1945.
China's recent rise (or “re‐rise” considering the Chinese regional dominance during 18 out of
the last 20 centuries) began in the late 1970s, particularly with Deng Xiaoping's accession to
power in the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1978. The (re‐)ascending process would
confirm China's central and rightful place among great powers in the world due to its unique
TABLE 1

Possible future trajectories of China as potential global hegemon

Intentional model

Historic precedent

Recent trend

“Peaceful Rise of China”/benevolent hegemony

British Empire
United States

Global Environment
UN Peacekeeping

“Violent Rise of China”/coercive hegemony

Napoleonic France
Wilhelmine Germany
Imperial Japan

Island building
Russia–China Entente

“Third Way”/Dutch‐style hegemony

The Netherlands

AIIB
China in the Arctic

Abbreviation: AIIB, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
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size and power in East Asia and its reputation as a regional hegemon. Subsequently, we must
emphasise that China underwent a double‐digit annual growth cycle throughout the 1980s,
1990s, and much of the early 2000s. Deng Xiaoping had foreseen the eventual (re‐)ascent of
his country and had keenly called for a strategy of “keeping a low profile” and “biding one's
time.” Concomitantly, beginning in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, China's grand strategy
of “Peaceful Rise,” later “Peaceful Development” (henceforth referred to only as PD), was articulated and implemented by China's high‐ranking decision‐makers, especially by Zheng Bijian,
policy advisor and Chair of the China Reform Forum.11 The new geostrategic trajectory of
China was confirmed with two white papers in 2005 and 2011, respectively, and by Zheng's publication in the September–October 2005 issue in of Foreign Affairs of his exceedingly important
foreign policy pronouncement, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great‐Power Status” (Zheng, 2005).
The grand strategic policy articulated in this publication set the course for China's ascent to
great power status through the pursuit of economic development as its central goal. The publication prompted the U.S. and Asian‐Pacific neighbours to grow increasingly concerned about
China's potential threat. That is, they feared China becoming a coercive power that would ultimately challenge the status quo in this strategically important region in Asia. Many voices in the
West viewed China on a power‐expansion trajectory similar to that carried out by the late 19th
century and early 20th century Germany (Goldstein, 2003; Mearsheimer, 2006). As we know
now, Germany's rise turned sour after Bismarck's retirement and Emperor Wilhelm took
charge, and Great Britain naturally challenged it immediately. Moreover, logically, the PRC is
determined to avoid this experience by all means necessary. Thus, arguably, the existence of
the PD grand strategy and China's avoidance of the Wilhelminian (post‐Bismarckian) path
may be only, perhaps, subterfuges to allay the West's and Japan's concerns and fears.
The 2008 Great Global Recession marks a critical historical juncture where Deng's strategy to
“keep a low profile” and “bide one's time” saw its result. The financial crisis began in the United
States, still the current global hegemon, and originally did not affect China as much as it did the U.
S. and other Western states. Quite the opposite, China was in a strong financial position to buy up
many technologically important companies and to support several Western states, such as Italy,
Spain, and Greece, through the purchase and financial backing of their government bonds. At that
time, when China became an international lender, the national perception in the PRC changed
from “biding one's time” to “now the time has come”—coincident with rising nationalism. It
seemed to Chinese decision‐makers that China was finally gaining ground over the United States
at a much faster pace than before the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis left the United States weaker,
sputtering, suffering financially, and losing ground to China steadily. It encouraged Chinese
decision‐makers, who probably surmised that China was finally gaining ground over the United
States at a fast pace. That is mainly the case among Chinese decision‐makers and other analysts
who customarily subscribe to a zero‐sum‐game perspective when interpreting world events and
developments. At this juncture, China became more assertive and increasingly proactive in pursuing its PD grand strategy (Economy, 2012). Accordingly, China engaged in this quest, without
changing its core priorities and only adjusting mildly how it pursues its grand strategic objectives.
Simultaneous to China's more aggressive pursuit of its PD grand strategy, however, internal
unrest has increased, particularly from minorities. Also, the economy started to falter, reducing
double‐digit growth to single digit. For example, the result of the possible trade war with the
United States, China's economic growth, measured by GDP, decreased to just over 6.5%
The change from “Peaceful Rise” to “Peaceful Development” was mainly due to the less threatening perception of
“development” compared with “rise.”
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(Yao, 2016). This rate of growth is still relatively high in comparison with the Western nations'
economic performance. For China, however, this reduced rate of economic growth means that it
is barely able to create additional jobs and lift more people out of abject poverty (BBC News,
2016; Trading Economics, 2016a, b, c, d).
Sustained economic growth is critically necessary for China to continue its robust development. If internal strife keeps China busy, then it may be unable to concentrate additional energy
and resources on becoming a paramount actor on the international stage to project its power
outward—regionally and globally. Moreover, if China's economy continues to falter and
stagnate into a recession, then it may resemble the Japan of the 1980s. At the time, experts
projected Japan to replace the United States as the next global economic hegemon. Poor
economic performance reversed Japan's ascendancy. It could happen to China, too (Powell,
2016; Samuelson, 2015).
Nevertheless, although this study also acknowledges this possible scenario about China's
economic future, it will bracket it out for the sake of argument. Thus, we assume that China will
recover from the slower speed of growth of its economy over the last several years and will
continue to grow. If that is the case, then China's economic recovery will purportedly coincide
with a potentially more isolationist United States under President Trump and an increasingly
divided Europe. The convergence of these conditions will provide China with ample space to
exert global hegemony.
As we focus on other aspects of China's foreign policy and intentions, we must return to the
original question of this study, that is, judging by China's intentions, what type of hegemon will
it become? This article maintains that Chinese purposeful behaviour since 2008 is quite
puzzling. On the one hand, China acts assertively and aggressively in the South China Sea
and the East China Sea. This behaviour is consistent with the coercive hegemon type.
On the other hand, China's participation in UN PKMs and global investments are consistent
with the peaceful, status‐quo‐oriented hegemon type. The analysis of these two tendencies will
help to elucidate the future course of a potential Chinese hegemony. In this sense, the study
concerns itself with the following auxiliary queries: Will China rise peacefully? Will it be a
violent ascent while it exhibits dominating, intimidating, and coercive intentions? Alternatively,
in addition to the two scenarios mentioned above, is there a third possibility?

5 | CHINA'S I NTENTIONS AND THE BENEVOLENT
HEGEMON TYPE
5.1 | Model Case 1: Global environmental policy as a form of
benevolent hegemony
Although China is known for neglecting its national environment in favour of economic development, it has made the topic of air pollution—along with the related problem of urban traffic—a
top priority of its national policy agenda during the past decade. There is necessarily an element
of self‐interest at work here, as there is mounting internal pressures on the Chinese government
to improve air quality. As such, China has become exponentially more open to contributing to
the health of the global environment as a consequence of this national effort.
As China often prides itself to be the voice of the “Third World,” it claims to be at the
forefront of several less developed countries' (LDCs) claims for greater leniency from global
environmental regulations. Thus, it argues that LDCs should be allowed to have higher CO2
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emissions for the next several decades. China's premise is that since the West had enjoyed open
and unregulated development, speaking from an environmental angle, for much of the 19th and
20th centuries, it is only fair to accord peripheral countries some degree of ecological flexibility.
In recent years, notwithstanding, China has softened its initial stance and has become a leader
in renewable energies, such as solar energy and wind power (Li, 2016).
As mentioned above, in the last decade—more or less coinciding with preparations for the
2008 Beijing Olympics—China changed its stance on global, transnational matters related to
environmental pollution, primarily CO2 emissions. It changed so radically that even Erik
Solheim, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Program, praised China's
new willingness. He affirmed that “China's (…) fight against climate change was exemplary.
He added that he appreciated China's proactive efforts to promote the [Paris Agreement] and
the country's leading role in global environment management” (Li, 2016). Solheim even went
as far as to declare that, “China is now the main driver of this agenda” (Li, 2016).
Before the most recent G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina in November 2018, China,
and the United States ratified the Paris Climate Agreement in September 2016 during the G20
meeting in China. During this meeting, U.S. President Obama and Chinese President Xi
formally approved the agreement, which went into effect on November 4, 2016, and “President
Xi [Jinping] vowed to ‘unwaveringly pursue sustainable development’” (Phillips, Harvey, &
Yuhas, 2016).
Insofar, given its support for and spearheading of the effort to reduce global warming and
environmental pollution, China demonstrates its new willingness to cooperate with other major
powers within the existing system of global governance such as the UN. Essentially, the reversal
of its stance regarding the concerted effort to preserve the environment is a significant departure
for China. Most observers and analysts of Chinese foreign policy never thought possible that
China would place such a high priority on this issue rather than on its customary emphasis
on economic performance and development. The fact that China changed its stance to coincide
with a position mainly promoted and supported by the West is indicative of China's ability and
willingness to adapt to the existing liberal global economic and political orders, as Ikenberry
(2013) often argues.

5.2 | Model Case 2: UN PKMs as a form of benevolent hegemony
Similar to China's reversal and readjustment of its global environmental policy, its
participation in and support of UN PKMs is another significant departure in its foreign policy
projection. As mentioned above, China endured the “Century of Humiliation” from 1839 to
1945, including semicolonial control by the West and Japan of many seaboard parts of its
territory. As a result, China's Republican‐Nationalist and Communist governments, respectively, placed a high premium and a firm emphasis on sovereignty in the Law of Nations.
Consequently, its focus on principles of noninterference and nonintervention into the internal
affairs of other states.
Again, speaking on behalf of former colonies and LDCs, China decried colonialism,
and, more generally, foreign interference in the internal affairs of any country. Even more
importantly, however, China condemned vehemently foreign powers' disregard for national
borders. Naturally, international law had changed in the 20th century to soften China's
understanding of sovereignty. Generally speaking, though, this was the “Golden Rule” before
1945. The end of the Second World War brought about a change in the inviolability of the

DANNER AND MARTÍN

197

sovereignty principle to allow space for the protection of ethnic groups in a foreign country
and prevent the risk of genocide. In this vein, China viewed with greater acceptance of
international involvement in internal problems when ethnic groups were at risk of
genocidal crimes. This change about the protection of ethnic groups was fundamental in
the development of the principle of “Responsibility to Protect.” As a result of this transformation in international law, the importance and sanctity of borders in international relations
became secondary to protecting individual human rights. The principle of “Responsibility to
Protect” was central in the modification of China's position regarding the implementation
of the UN PKMs.
According to China's former stance on sovereignty and noninterference into the internal
affairs of nation‐states, UN PKMs were one instance of foreign powers meddling in the internal affairs of a given country. Insofar, this was the case; China did not agree with the concept
of PKMs and, therefore, did not participate in these missions. However, influenced by the
principle of “Responsibility to Protect,” the PRC underwent a substantial change regarding
PKMs in the 1990s and 2000s. China altered its outlook on PKMs slowly but continuously
from extreme opposition to neutrality about other nations' participation with civilian delegates
and to direct military engagement. Among the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council with veto power, China is by far the member that commits and sends more troops
to PKMs (Fung, 2016).
The previous discussion provides evidence strongly suggesting that China has experienced a
remarkable transformation in its foreign policy projection. That is, China appears to have
shifted its position from being wholly opposed to the UN PKMs to become increasingly an
advocate and leader of these PKMs worldwide. Such a foreign policy departure is another indication, along Ikenberry's argument, suggesting that China may be willing and capable to
adjusting and adapting to the liberal global order—though, naturally, there may be an element
of self‐interest involved, as the People's Liberation Army gains valuable practical experience
from these missions. As such, this supports the view of those who think that China could take
over or assume the leadership of the international liberal order from the United States at a time
if and when the United States appears to be unable, materially speaking, and politically and
principally unwilling to provide peacekeeping functions.

6 | C H I N A ' S I N T E N T I O N S AN D T H E CO E R C I V E HE G E M O N
TYPE
6.1 | Model Case 1: Island building in the South China Sea as a form of
Coercive hegemony
China continued to pursue through 2018 an aggressive strategy to expand and maintain a
foothold in the South China Sea. It claimed rocks, islets, and archipelagos in this body of water
to enlarge its maritime territory and reach deep into Southeast Asia, close to the Malacca Strait.
China achieved this objective at the expense of several Southeast Asian states who also claim
jurisprudence in this area. These are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan.
These states' claims clash with China's in the area that the Chinese refer to as the
“Nine‐Dash‐Line.”
China bases its territorial claim on historical maps, albeit they are not entirely conclusive. A
2016 verdict by an International Tribunal based in The Hague ruled negatively against China: In
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a case where the Philippines filed a complaint against Chinese conduct disregarding its
maritime borders, the verdict ruled against China and in favour of the Philippines. China, of
course, ignored and disavowed the ruling, as well as making clear that the tribunal did not have
jurisdiction over the matter (Phillips, Holmes, & Bowcott, 2016).
China has gone beyond publicly announcing its territorial claim. Instead, it has actively
started to produce real and tangible facts by engaging in the process of “island building.” The
construction process begins by China taking an islet, which sometimes is not larger than a rock,
and transferring building materials via ship to create helipads, harbours, and airstrips. Some
have compared these artificial islands with sort of China's stationary aircraft carriers. China
wants to send a loud and clear signal to regional neighbours and the rest of the world, particularly to other great powers. It wants to underscore its maritime territorial claims, with absolute
and full vigour and unwavering resolve. Hence, rather than leaving unperturbed uninhabited
and partially submerged islands, rocks, and islets, without any physical signs of territorial claim
and sovereignty, China builds this new‐aged military bases. These are all projections of China's
geostrategic reach.
China's fortification drive and island‐building program in the South China Sea is consistent
with revisionist and coercive policies. It deliberately revises borders. This trend is reminiscent of
the violent rising by other great powers in history. France, Germany, and Imperial Japan in the
18th and 20th centuries, respectively, pursued such territorial expansion and aggressive practice.
This aggressive territorial expansion constitutes the type of evidence that many analysts will
cease on to conclude that China is on a collision course with other great powers and neighbours.
The policy will lead to diplomatic and possibly military conflict over these territories. In this
sense, it will be a harbinger of China's violent rise.

6.2 | Model Case 2: The emerging Sino‐Russian Entente as a form of
coercive hegemony
At the end of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the PRC and the Soviet Union became close allies.
Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Josef Stalin formally instituted this political, ideological,
and military alliance by negotiating and signing the Treaty of Moscow in 1950. At this juncture,
the Soviet Union was the senior partner whereas the newly established PRC was the junior
member of the alliance. China was still recovering from the Japanese occupation and protracted
civil war.
A decade after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, it became evident that political interests
and ideology were not sufficiently strong to keep these two actors together in an alliance. Thus,
from 1960 onward, the Sino‐Soviet split became increasingly evident and pronounced, even
including a 7‐month undeclared military border conflict in 1969 that exacerbated further the
Sino‐Soviet split. The tense rivalry and differences between these two communist actors
ultimately led to a de facto end to the alliance in 1979.
At this point, China's tendency to side with the West and the United States became more
evident, too. It led to the official opening of relations with the United States in the same year.
Already several years prior, in 1972, unofficial diplomatic ties under President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger opened the door to China. Renewed relations led to China's gradual
embrace of the market economy. This decision was fundamental in China's development and
economic success from the early 1980s to approximately 2014.
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Interestingly, though, China has grown closer to Russia more recently.12 We identify two
interconnected examples to highlight and underscore better the recent Chinese and Russian
connection: First, it is China's tacit support for Russia's annexation of Crimean, and, second,
the treaty on energy cooperation negotiated and signed by China and Russia concomitantly to
the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of the Eastern Ukraine war in 2014.
First, China's reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea was mute (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). We must emphasise that before 2005, the
PRC would have severely condemned and sternly opposed Russia. Russian annexation of Crimea was anathema to China's fundamental principles and priorities (Sun, 2015). On the one
hand, it was a violation of sovereignty and the noninterference in the internal affairs of another
country. On the other hand, the annexation challenged China directly on two additional fronts:
First, its zealous commitment to defend its territory against aggression and, second, its commitment to protect minorities within Chinese borders. Notwithstanding, China remained uncharacteristically distant and quiet.
Second, the media outlets reported the energy treaty with Russia as the deepening of the Sino‐
Russian relationship amid the Eastern Ukrainian crisis and Western sanctions against Russia. It
was also a Russian carrot extended to China for its allegiance, tacit political support of the Crimea
annexation, and the significant Chinese financial package. This agreement was crucial for Russian
prowess at a juncture when it was simultaneously fighting an undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine
and escalating its military involvement in the Syrian civil war to protect the government of its political ally, President Bashar al‐Assad. In exchange for its advanced hefty financial package, Russia
agreed to sell oil and natural gas at rates considerably lower than current market prices.13
It is plausible to argue here that the PRC agreed to the terms of the 2014 energy agreement
on two grounds. First, the economic benefits accruing to China were too vast and attractive to
ignore. Second, the agreement granted the PRC the first opportunity and greatest satisfaction to
become the senior partner in the Sino‐Russian alliance since the signing of the Treaty of
Moscow in 1950, when the Soviet Union was the senior partner.
The trend in China's international relations examined thus far would suggest a Chinese move
toward revisionism, aggressiveness, and coerciveness insofar as the PRC condoned Russia's
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Besides, China and Russia appear to share their opposition against united actions by the West's politico‐military alliance. The Sino‐Russian universal
resistance against the West seems to be supported by evidence from the West's sanctions against
Russia in the aftermath of the Eastern Ukrainian crisis.
China's reaction suggests that it is preparing the grounds in case of future challenges to its
rise by the West. It appears as if China is signalling to the West and the entire world that it is
prepared to defend its place among great powers, even if it entails the use of force and mass violence. Such actions are consistent with the violent ascent of rising great powers in the history of
the world such as Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan. From this vantage point, the previous analysis suggests that China is on track to follow the footsteps of those other yesteryear
revisionists and coercive rising hegemons.
12

The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation are two distinct entities from earlier years. Nonetheless, they have one
thing in common: Both are, respectively, former and present antagonists of the U.S.‐led Western alliance. Therefore,
they play similar roles in China's balance‐of‐power calculations.

13

Although the specific rates of oil and gas have not been made public, most energy consultants and analysts agree that
China was able to obtain a highly attractive price and considerably less than the market price. This was achieved in
exchange for an advanced financial package to Russia at a time that was in pressing need of liquidity while fighting
two costly military involvements in Eastern Ukraine and Syria.
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7 | C H I N A ' S I N T E N T I O N S AN D T H E DU T C H‐ STYLE
HEGEMON TY PE
7.1 | Model Case 1: Establishment of the AIIB as a form of Dutch‐style
hegemony
President Xi Jinping suggested in 2013 that a new financial institution was necessary for Asia.
He was reacting against the global financial system dominated by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the main regional development bank
for the Asia‐Pacific. Naturally, Xi's reaction was due to the fact that these institutions were
set up by the U.S. and its allies and are presently still dominated by them. For example, the
U.S. and Japan are proportionally the largest shareholders in the ADB with each holding 15.6
per cent of shares, compared to China's 6.4 per cent. In addition, the president of the ADB
has traditionally always come from Japan, currently Takehiko Nakao. Thus, Xi recommended
an institution that would work more efficiently and with fewer conditions attached and that
it was strictly economic, discouraging great powers meddling into other nations' internal affairs.
To that end, China then proposed the establishment of the AIIB. This institution attracted at
first a broad interest among neighbouring Asian states. It was welcomed initially by most of
them, except American allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. They appeared hesitant
to participate as founding members. However, the appeal of the new bank led South Korea and
Taiwan to submit their applications to join as founding members—notwithstanding, Taiwan's
rejection. Other U.S. allies such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and several European states joined the AIIB, too.
The sequence of events described above stands as a loss for the American diplomatic apparatus and a tremendous gain for the Chinese. Also, China rejected the application of North Korea
to become a founding member. Why? This rejection signalled to the rest of the world that China
was a responsible actor, unlikely to be influenced by the narrow interests of protégés such as a
rogue North Korea. The founding document was signed in mid‐2015 and ratified before the end
of the year by the necessary member quorum for the AIIB to begin operating officially from its
headquarter in Beijing.
China's idea and the successful founding of the AIIB met a mixed response in the media—
ranging from finally living up to calls to be a responsible leading great power on the international stage to advancing its regional hegemonic interests in Asia. All in all, the AIIB can
be seen as a Chinese stimulus package for the Asian and world economies, without any
political strings attached. This outcome is in stark contrast to similar institutions, such as the
IMF or ADB.
The type of action by China and its engagement of the international community is consistent
with China's tradition to handle global hegemony with a high premium placed on trade and
without much concern for territory, politics, or military conflict. The Netherlands was a global
hegemon in this tradition from 1585 to 1740. The trend discussed above would speak for China
following in its footsteps. Specifically, the Dutch model refers to a global hegemon entirely
focused on trade, finance, and disinterested in the internal affairs of its trade partners. If one
may, this model may be called the global commercial hegemon. Naturally, the Netherlands
had the necessary trade network and the ships and waterways to support it. China, similarly,
is getting there, though, it still profits much from U.S. naval protection of sea lanes of communication. The so‐called Beijing Consensus, which promotes Chinese trade with all nations while
bracketing out political aspects, enabling it to trade with democracies, dictatorships, and
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everything in between. Incidentally, the discussion and description above fit quite well with this
Dutch model of a global commercial hegemon.

7.2 | Model Case 2: China's increased interest in the Arctic as a form of
Dutch‐style (“Third‐Way”) hegemony
Since the late 2000s, China became increasingly interested in having a presence in the North
Pole. Given the accelerated receding of ice caps, Chinese strategists envisioned the possibility
of future sea lanes opening up through the Arctic Ocean (Kuo & Tang, 2015). These new sea
lanes would shorten navigation time considerably and would render trade more efficient and
profitable (Lanteigne, 2016). Hence, anticipating possible benefits, Chinese decision‐makers
succeeded to position China in the conversation about the North Pole to benefit from new
potential sea lanes (Danner, 2018).
For instance, the Northwest Passage would shorten the way from Northeast Asia to New York by
2,500 miles, compared with the longer and more expensive route through the Panama Canal. Also,
the Northern Sea route would shorten the way from Northeast Asia to Hamburg by almost
6,000 miles as compared with circumnavigating via the Malacca Strait, Suez Canal, and Gibraltar
Strait routes (Abel, 2012). Finally, the vanishing ice caps will reveal possibilities for prospecting
and exploiting oil and natural gas from below the oceanic seabed. Developing and controlling
energy sources is a top priority in China's energy security strategy (Opsal, 2019, pp. 103–144).
In the past few years, China underscored its interest in the North Pole via multiple channels,
as Gushin (2013) explains:
China has stepped up Arctic and Antarctic research. Between 1985 and 2012, Beijing
initiated five Arctic (…) expeditions. It has also built the state‐owned Arctic Yellow
River Station and entered into an agreement with the Finnish company Aker Arctic
Technology to construct a second icebreaker by 2014, joining the one that Beijing
bought from Ukraine in 1993. Moreover, Chinese representatives take part in the
Arctic Science Committee, Arctic Science Summit Week, Ny‐Ålesund Science
Managers Committee, and the International Polar Year project. In a nutshell,
China “is spending around $60 million annually on polar research, building a
China‐Nordic Arctic Research Centre in Shanghai, and plans to increase the
research staff by a factor of five, to 1,000.”
Despite China's interests in the Arctic, it did not claim any territory. Further, it did not fabricate
a territorial presence as it did in the South China Sea. Nonetheless, it became a permanent
observer to the Arctic Council in 2013. This entity is the main body of eight states that possess
access or own territory in the Arctic. Canada, Denmark (which also represents the Faroe Islands
and Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States are the eight
states that constitute the Arctic Council.
China's apparent indifference to owning territory in the Polar Arctic suggests that its strategic
plan is merely to partake in the exploration and exploitation of the Arctic and benefitting from
possible shorter and quicker shipping lanes. Also, by granting China observer status, the eight
member‐state Arctic Council signalled the recognition of China's future role in the area unambiguously. As Gushin (2013) puts it, “China is playing a prudent long game in the region, with
economics as the driving factor.”
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In essence, the tendency thus far exhibited by China's actions concerning the Arctic reveals a
profound economic interest. However, it is still too early to claim that it is uninterested in
pursuing military, strategic, and political objectives. China's lack of territorial claims in the
polar region and its attendant disregard for challenging those of others are soft indications of
its indifference to pursuing other state objectives beyond economic gains.
The evidence discussed in this section reveals China is rising much in line with the historical
experience of the former Dutch global hegemony. During its economic heydays in the 16th and
17th centuries, the Netherlands did not overly pursue territory and military prowess. Instead,
the Dutch's main focus was profiting through the promotion of international trade and finance.

8 | CONCLUSION: BENEVOLENT, COERCIVE, OR
DUTCH‐ STYLE HEG E MON Y I N CHI NA ' S F UT UR E ?
This article attempted to decipher and explain China's rise and its future direction as a significant leader in the international system. First, consistent with the benevolent‐hegemon type, we
observed how China's active involvement in the management of the global environment and the
UN PKMs indicate this possibility. Nonetheless, these are mainly political activities rather than
economic.
The benevolent‐hegemon type would suggest proactive and liberal sociopolitical and
economic practices. Thus far, China does not appear willing and able to implement these in
the immediate future. First, it refuses to open its national market fully to the foreign competitor.
Second, it maintains a very tight grip on its currency value and fluctuation for narrow, selfish,
national interests. Third, it rejects promoting freer and fairer trade among all actors, irrespective
of their level of reciprocity. To be sure, China is a hugely wealthy actor, but one that practices a
type of neomercantilist approach in the international market as evidenced by its business
practices in the global economy.
Second, we also observed China's island‐building policy and its drive for the establishment of
a Sino‐Russian Entente to neutralise a potential regional and systemic enemy. These are actions
that we categorise as consistent with the coercive‐hegemon type, similar to the cases of
Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan and in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively.
Third, we identified signs of a possible “Third Way.” It is similar to the type of global hegemony defined and practised by the Dutch from the late 16th to the mid‐18th centuries. It would
be a global hegemony solely focused on trade and financial concerns, without the interference
of violent conflicts or impositions of political and ideological norms and values. From the
Dutch‐style vantage point, a Chinese hegemon would be relatively neutral in terms of ideology,
partially uninvolved in the management of the international state system, and mostly interested
in profit‐maximisation, without the use (or threat) of military actions. In sum, calm and stable
political, economic, and security environments are welcome news to Chinese strategists in the
short and medium run. Why is that the case?
Ideologically speaking, China cannot be a benevolent hegemon, and militarily and politically
speaking, it lacks the type of conventional power and reputation for exerting the kind of global
influence necessary to manage the international state and market systems. Regarding ideology,
Yan Xuetong argues, for example, that China will have to go beyond the current trajectory of
“combin[ing] Marxism with Chinese traditional values” and instead “shape the international
order by combining some Chinese traditional values with selected liberalist values (…) [which]
could be acceptable to most countries because of their universality” (Yan, 2018, p. 1).

DANNER AND MARTÍN

203

It is difficult to define China's future hegemonic role and its general systemic behaviour
accurately. However, as this article argued, the “Third Hegemonic Way” or Dutch‐style hegemony is highly instructive in this context. Accordingly, this third alternative proposition adds
to the current debate and inventory of plausible explanation of China's peaceful or violent rise
as either a benevolent or potentially coercive hegemon.
We argued that Dutch‐style hegemony might be the most viable way for China to proceed in
its global hegemonic ascendancy. Although China has registered a substantial economic and
financial growth since 1989, its population still possesses, relative to other global great powers,
lower per capita income and relatively small purchasing power. In this vein, the relatively inexpensive labour cost and its mainly export‐oriented economy still figure as China's main engine
of economic and financial growth. Further, China's national market remains quite small in
terms of per capita purchasing power. Hence, it needs peaceful, stable, and relatively prosperous
international economic and state systems to continue to thrive and to grow. We project that
China's leadership will make sure to keep it that way.
Also, China's incomplete and unbalanced power inventory renders it too weak militarily as a
near‐hegemon to compete aggressively against the United States. Further, China would be
considerably less competitive if it has to face a potential military alliance among the United
States, Western Europe, India, and possibly Russia. In summary, China must remain commercially active and militarily peaceful on the bases of its economic prowess and its conventional
military competitive disadvantage14 vis‐à‐vis the United States and its potential allies. Hence,
Dutch‐style hegemony is a perfect fit for China's immediate and mid‐range future.
Accordingly, the study concludes that, although it is exceedingly difficult to predict with a high
degree of certainty which way China will go in the future, Dutch‐style hegemony is the most plausible explanation of China's direction and role in the international system. However, plausibility
does not mean certainty; thus, we are mindful of conflicting evidence that simultaneously points
to either China's peaceful (benevolent intentions) or violent rise (coercive intentions).
Despite the evidence supporting all three possible future trajectories, the Third Way or the
Dutch style is more congruent with China's international behaviour since 2001. China does
not truly challenge the existing order in terms of political values, ideological norms, or regime
types. The “Beijing Consensus” promotes trading with any country, irrespective to the political
system, that is, governments raging from liberal democracies, such as the United States, to
staunch totalitarian dictatorships such as Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela. China's focus is
on sovereignty and not on regime type. As Suisheng Zhao argues, China is in fact “[e]mbracing
the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty, (…) while adapting to the liberal norms of globalization, China is (…) dissatisfied not with the fundamental rules of the order but its status in
the hierarchy of the order” (2018, p. 643).
Dutch‐style hegemony may have in store a significant lesson for China about overemphasising
extreme economic pragmatism over political and ideological commitment. Unbalanced priorities
may ultimately lead to decline. This condition was the case of the Dutch empire and how it lost
power to the English and French in the 18th century. The Dutch weakened their international
standing over trade and colonial possessions.
During the Revolutionary War in the United States, the Dutch continued to trade with
American Revolutionaries and the enemies of England. This development led to one of the several
Anglo‐Dutch Wars that ultimately weakened the Netherlands. The British viewed Dutch behaviour cutting into its political and economic spheres. It is possible that the British could have
14

With the notable exception of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
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tolerated purely commercial relations, but trade strengthened the American revolutionaries and,
thus, weakened the strategic interests of the British worldwide. Because the British were rising as a
global hegemon, they viewed the Dutch's behaviour as cutting into British global domination and
leadership. In sum, it was impossible to disaggregate purely economic interest from political and
strategic calculations. Had there been no hegemonic competition as was the case during the U.S.
unipolar moment from 1991 until 2001, then, perhaps, the British would have consented to the
Dutch economic relations with the American revolutionaries.
The episode discussed above is instructive for present United States–Chinese relations and
economic rivalry. Because they are competing for global hegemony, they must be careful about
whom they trade with and how this may or may not undercut the political and strategic interests of the other. It is mainly the case with China who chooses to ignore U.S. sanctions against
some rogue states such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela.
In terms of present general probability, it does not seem likely that China will take over the leadership of the U.S.‐instituted liberal economic and political global order as the Americans did from
the British in the early 20th century. Notwithstanding, much of China's hegemonic trajectory could
also depend on how it will develop internally in terms of its economy and politics. In this sense, for
example, Shambaugh (2016) argues in his China's Future for reforms of the Chinese party‐state to
softer authoritarianism. Further, it seems unlikely that China will institute its leadership and global
hegemony via violent conflict, much like Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Imperial
Japan. Instead, as expounded above, the Dutch‐style (or “Third Way”) global hegemony appears to
be a more likely trajectory. Provided, of course, China remains to exhibit strictly trade‐oriented,
politically neutral, and self‐interested pecuniary intentions in the next decade.
In closing, we think the “Third Way” belongs in the general discourse on China's ascent. This
alternative explanation will add substance to an intractable and enduring debate. Its absence by
design or by omission will render the discussion about the peaceful or violent rise of China
incomplete and myopic.
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